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TRADITION AND COMMONSENSE
IN ADMIRALTY
By ERNEST BRUNCKEN*
W HERE a foreign vessel comes into American waters and on ac-
count of negligent or unskillful management collides with another
ship, the federal courts may take jurisdiction to adjudicate damages,
according to the principles and procedure of admiralty. They will, as
a first step to do justice, take possession of such vessel, and not al-
low it to leave port until a proper bond has been given that the owners
will return to the jurisdiction of the court and abide by whatever de-
cree may be found against them. Suppose, however, that the ship
collided, under similar circumstances, with a wharf, a bridge, or any
other marine appliance located on the land. In that case, assuming
that the master of the vessel is not over-conscientious, he may leave
port, and the vessel may never return to the United States, leaving the
owner of the damaged property -to the slim chances of getting redress
by the ordinary procedure of courts in some foreign country. For it
is held that a tort committed upon a floating vessel, though the tort-
feasor may be on the land while he commits .the wrongful act, is with-
in the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts; but that a wrongful act by
a vessel is not within that jurisdiction, if the resulting damage is done
upon the land.
This curious legal anomaly has become of considerable importance
to the wharf owners, ports, and municipalities in this country; and the
possibility of changing the rule has recently been discussed by the
American Association of Port Authorities, and several committees of
the American Bar Association.
THE RuLE IN THE PLYMOUTH CASE
The rule of which complaint is made is that laid down in the case of
Hough et al. v. The Western Transportation Company, more commonly
known as The Plymouth, reported in 3 Wall. 20 (18 Lawy. ed. 125).
The U. S. Supreme Court there held, in the year 1865, that the U. S.
District Court had no jurisdiction in the matter for the reason that
the injury, although originating on board of a floating vessel, was con-
summated on land, and therefor not of a maritime nature. The only
* Member of the Milwaukee Bar, and Secretary of the Milwaukee Harbor Com-
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ground on which this decision was based was the old English rule that
in the case of torts admiralty jurisdiction depended on the locality,
meaning that the tort must have been committed on navigable water;
and an extension of this, that the injury must also have been con-'
summated on the water. For the latter extension, no reason is given,
except the tacit acceptance of its validity on the strength of some an-
cient English authorities cited by the respondent. The attitude of the
latter is characterized by the statement in his brief that "we broke the
Constitution by discarding the limit of tidewater and the sovereign ar-
bitrament of the moon."
This insufficiently argued, and as we firmly believe, erroneous de-
cision has been followed in a number of cases, not one of which re-
considers the basis on which the precedent was founded, so that now
it establishes -the accepted rule of jurisdiction exclusively on the prin-
ciple of stare decisis.
Among the cases in the Supreme Court which form this line of
precedent are the following:
Ex parte Phoenix, 118 U.S. 610.
Johnson v. Ch. and Pac. Elevator Co., 119 U.S. 388.
Cleveland Term'l and Valley R'y. Co. v. Cleveland Steamship Co.,
208 U.S. 110.
The Troy, 208 U.S. 321.
The Panoil, 266 U.S. 432.
In Gonsalves v. Dry Dock Co., 266 U.S. 171 the Court repeats with a
little apparent show of irritation, "the fact that admiralty jurisdiction in
tort matters depends on locality, is settled."
Under these circumstances few lawyers would care to attempt con-
vincing the court that the rule in the Plymou-th case is not the law; but
that does not contradict the proposition that it ought not to be the law.
If that assertion is true, obviously the proper step is to apply to Con-
gress for an enactment conferring the necessary jurisdiction on the
Courts of the United States. It is claimed, however, that under the
Constitution, Congress has no power to do so. The question, accord-
ingly, is whether the Constitution would authorize a statute giving to
the District Courts jurisdiction over torts committed by floating ves-
sels, if the damage is partly or entirely extending to property or per-
sons on the land.
Before I attempt to answer this question however, I desire to analyze
-the present rule with a view of showing its double error, and the fine-
spun argumentation by which it is upheld. The decision in the Plymouth
case in -the first place upholds once again the narrow rule of locality;
and secondly attempts to divide the tort and its consequences, resulting
in damages, by stating, without giving a reason, that although the -tort
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was committed under the jurisdiction of the U. S. District Court, if
the consequences extend to the land, that jurisdiction is lost. One should
think that commonsense would suggest precisely the opposite; that -the
tortious act was the principal thing, and that the damages, wherever
they occurred, would of necessity follow the act, as the accessory every-
where else in law, logic, and commonsense follows the principal. It
would seem that the court itself has felt that its position was untenable.
For in a number of cases it has tried to modify its rule by finding ex-
cuses for taking a case out of it; as when it held that injury done to
a cluster of piles, resting on the bottom, but not laterally connected with
the land, was within the admiralty jurisdiction.'
NATURE OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
The reason why some lawyers hold that an act of Congress conferring
upon courts of the United States jurisdiction in cases under contempla-
tion would be unconstitutional is not a denial that the rule complained
of is absurd. They might even admit the absurdity; but they hold that
no power under the sun, short of three-fourths of all the states in the
Union acting to amend the Constitution, can change that rule, however
inconvenient to very great interests of shippers, wharf-owners, and
municipalities. They hold in effect that the practice of common law
courts in Great Britain, at the Declaration of Independence, is a part
of the Constitution of the United States.
The federal courts have authority to deal with maritime cases by
virtue of a clause in section 2, subsection 1, of Article III of the Con-
stitution, which reads "the judicial power shall extend to all cases
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." From the very beginning,
a vigorous contest has raged about the interpretation of this clause.
There have been those who held that under its text the jurisdiction
which Congress may confer on any court must be strictly confined to
cases of a character which, if occurring in England, would have been
cognizable by the Court of the Admiral on the day when the thirteen
colonies separated from the mother country. On the other hand, many
eminent lawyers, headed by no less a person than Justice Story, have
contended that the jurisdiction our federal courts may exercise ex-
tends potentially to all matters connected with the sea and the ships,
in the sense of the maritime "jus gentim." Unfortunately it must be
stated, with all due respect to the Supreme Court, that its decisions have
oscillated from one side of this question to the other, in such a manner
that the maritime and admiralty law of the United States, at least on
the instance side, is now full of the most glaring inconsistencies.
'Doullub & Williams Co. v. U.S., 268 U.S. 33.
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The true meaning of the constitutional grant of power may be ap-
proached conveniently by first analyzing the two terms, "admiralty and
maritime." We cannot, of course, assume as is apparently done quite
frequently, that the two words are mere synonyms. That would be
charging the draftsmen of the Constitution with insufferable tautology.
"Admiralty," if standing 'by itself, would indicate reasonably, that the
draftsmen intended that the United States courts should exercise such
jurisdiction as the British court of admiralty at that time possessed,
and none other. No different interpretation would be possible. For
"admiralty" is a specifically English term, referring to a peculiarly Eng-
lish institution, the court of the Lord High Admiral and his deputies,
who under a grant from the King exercised as a personal and lucrative
franchise the judicial power over certain causes. His court was jeal-
ously watched by the regular law courts, who were quick, by writs
of prohibition and otherwise, to restrict -his jurisdiction to the narrowest
practicable limits. There was no analogous institution in other countries,
at least not at the time of our Revolution. In England itself, it has
since been abolished. If the makers of the Constitution had meant to
give only this sort of jurisdiction to the courts, they would presumably
have stopped after this word; but they added the word "maritime."
This is, obviously, a term of much wider significance. It denotes the
international law of the sea: the "Seerecht," as -the Germans, or the
"Droit de Mer," as the French denominate it. This body of law deals
with all things that pertain to the sea or the ships. It was, in principle,
adopted at a very early day by every civilized seafaring nation in the
world, with such modification as they might deem appropriate under
their specific conditions. The British admiralty law was such a local
modification. Adding this broader term to the term "admiralty" could
have but one purpose, that of guarding against that narrow construction
which has so often been attempted in this country. It might be asked,
however, why if the federal courts are to have jurisdiction of all cases
arising under the international sea-law of the world, the Constitution
adds the word "admiralty." The answer is obvious. The international
maritime law lays down rules regarding rights and duties arising from
the sea and navigation. It says nothing as to how -these shall be ad-
judged. Admiralty law means the way in which the English are in the
habit of administering so much of the sea law as they administer in that
particular court. To add it to the constitutional clause is merely to say
that our federal courts will follow, in their practice, the rules of the
English admiralty courts, as was done by the vice-admirals exercising
jurisdiction in the colonies, subject to such changes as Congress may
from time to time enact. Admiralty law was the existing law of the
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thirteen colonies, and consequently of the new independent states, un-
til it was changed by constitution or statute.
This construction of the constitutional clause is substantially that
for which Justice Story contended in his elaborate and learned treat-
ment of the problem in De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 452, Fed. Cases No.
3776.
It is also implied in many of the leading cases in the Supreme Court
of the United States.
Waring v. Clark, 5 Howard 441.
N.J. Steam Nay. Co. v. Bank, 6 How. 387.
The Vengeance, 3 Dallas 297.
The Betsey, 4 Cranch 443.
New Engl. Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1.
The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443.
Jackson v. The Magnolia, 20 How. 296.
THE RULE OF "WITHIN THE BODY OF A COUNTY"
From the days of King Richard II until the final abolition of the
court of the Lord High Admiral in 1872, there went on, in England,
an embittered struggle for jurisdiction between the admiralty court and
the common law tribunals, more particularly the Court of Exchequer
Chamber. Acts of Parliament, resolutions of the Privy Council, and
writs of prohibition issuing out of common law courts were the principal
weapons. The war began with the attempts of the admiralty judges
to extend their jurisdiction to all sorts of matters connected with the
sea and the ships by the most tenuous threads only, for the purpose of
harvesting fees, fines, and amercements, to be distributed between
themselves and the holder of the feudal dignity of Admiral. To restrain
this rapacity, the acts of 13 and 15 Rich. II and 2 Henry IV were passed
in Parliament. These still left to the Admiralty Court substantially
the jurisdiction growing naturally out of the international law of -the
sea, both on the instance and prize side of the Court. The common
law courts, however, were not satisfied, in part because their judges and
officers also coveted fees; but largely for the more respectable reason
that the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts soon became entangled with
the perennial struggle between the Crown and Parliament. The Ad-
miralty shared in the favor bestowed upon special courts under the Tu-
dor Kings. Like the Star Chamber, the High Commission, and the
Chancery, they used procedure based on Civil Law principles; and the
maritime law itself was more closely akin to the Roman than -to the
common law. When the quarrel between the Stuarts and the Parliament
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broke, these special courts, as everybody knows, were considered as the
particular bulwarks of arbitrary government, while the courts of com-
mon law were believed to be the special champions of popular liberty.
They were not slow in taking advantage of their political position. By
means of writs of prohibition, they made it hard for litigants who would
have preferred to take advantage of the simple and efficient rules of
the admiralty; on the other hand, they did their -best to scare people
by emphasizing the fact that in admiralty there was no jury; for at that
time trial by jury was popular -as one of the "bulwarks of liberty." The
outcome was that by the middle of the eighteenth century the admiralty
courts had ceased to take jurisdiction in many causes where it was
certain that a prohibition would come from the common law courts, al-
though they never, in principle, renounced their ancient powers of admin-
istering justice in all matters pertaining to the sea and the ships, just as
the proper courts did in all other countries.
Out of this struggle, which at its best was purely political, and all
too commonly degenerated into a mean and selfish battle for fees, grew
the specifically English rule that the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction,
so far as locality goes, is confined to the high seas, and that it extends
to estuaries, bays, and rivers, "below the first bridge," only concurrently
with the common law courts. When the tide was in, the Admiral's
officers might function; when the tide was out, the common law had
exclusive sway. As a common law judge expressed it frankly, in Mene-
tone v. Gibbons: 3 Term Rep. 267. "If the common law can try the
cause, the Admiralty shall not."
This principle was crystallized in the formula that admiralty had no
jurisdiction "intra corpus comitatus." Even the English courts could
not carry this out consistently, for the very reasons which have led all
civilized nations to accept an international maritime law recognizing
to a certain extent rights and duties, and practices, different from the
ordinary law of the land, simply because the requirements of navigation
demand this. The most conspicuous yielding of common law jealousies
to these necessities is the case of contracts for seaman's wages, which
have always been conceded to be maritime, even although they were
entered into within "the body of a county" at home. In this country,
the rule has to all intents and purposes been abandoned. The exten-
sion of admiralty jurisdiction to all navigable waters, whether the tide
ebbs and flows therein or not, has settled that question.2
Waring v. Clark, 5 Howard 448.
The Genesee Chief, 12 Howard 443.
Jackson v. The Magnolia, 20 Howard 301.
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THE LOCALITY AS TEST IN TORTS
While it is now settled that admiralty may have jurisdiction, although
the navigable water is within a county, the offspring or corollary of that
rule is still being upheld by our courts. It is the well-known distinction
that in cases of contract, admiralty has jurisdiction if the contract is
maritime in its nature, but that it can take jurisdiction in torts only if
the wrong, though maritime in its nature, was committed-no longer,
to .be sure, outside of any particular county-but on the water. There
is no reason in the nature of maritime law for this rule. It was, appar-
ently, conceived in England on no better pretext than the highly techni-
cal one that, if the tort, though maritime in its nature, started on land,
the admiralty process could not be served; for the officers of the ad-
miralty court were allowed to serve process only on the water, while the
sheriff's officer, presumably, had no means of boarding a ship afloat.
We may admit, however, that for the present the accepted American
rule is that locality determines admiralty jurisdiction in torts; we may
even admit that, under the rule in the Plymouth case, the injury must
also be consummated on the water, or the admiralty jurisdiction ceases;
but if we agree that this is so, not because the general maritime law
in its nature demands these rules, but merely on account of the history
of admiralty law in England and the accident that our courts have, ill-
advisedly, followed English precedents in the matter-then we must
admit that the Congress may change the rule.
As Justice Bradley said, as far back almost as the Plymouth case it-
self, to-wit in 1870: "The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is not
limited by the statutes or judicial prohibition of England."3
If that is so in the matter of an insurance contract, why should if be
different when an unskillful captain runs into the bridge across -the
river ?
THE POWER 0 CONGRESS TO LEGISLATE
The power of Congress to legislate as it sees fit regarding the jurisdic-
tion of the federal admiralty courts, as long as it remains within the
grant of the Constitution, will hardly be disputed. As was said by Justice
Grier, in a case involving the assumption of jurisdiction in a collision
occurring, above tidewater, in the Alabama River:
Congress might give any of these courts the whole or so much of the
admirality jurisdiction as it saw fit. It might extend their jurisdic-
tion over all navigable waters, and all ships and vessels thereon, or over
some navigable waters and vessels of a certain description only.
'New Engl. Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1.
'Jackson v. The Magiwlia, 20 How. 296.
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The arguments have all turned on the question whether the power of
Congress would still be within the constitutional grant, if it exceeded the
powers of the English admiralty. Even as to that, there seems to have
been no difficulty in the beginning. The first Congress, in the Judiciary
Act of 1789, included in admiralty jurisdiction "seizures under laws
of impost, navigation, or trade, where the seizures are made on waters
navigable from the sea." This provision was upheld in the case of La
Vengeance, and on the strength of that decision in numbers of other
cases. 5
Evidently, the Congress, in which there were men who had sat in
the constitutional convention, did not think that American "admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction" was identical with British admiralty. For
seizures of this kind were clearly not within British admiralty juris-
diction. True, colonial vice-admirals had exercised such powers. That,
however, was under the navigation laws, more particularly the Act of
7 and 8 Williams III, ch. 22, and not under admiralty law. See Luke
v. Lyde, 2 Burr. 822.
Yet, on the strength of its being "pertaining to the sea and the ships,"
the matter of seizures was given to the federal courts.
Other early cases in which it is recognized that Congress -is not bound
by English admiralty restrictions are: The Sandw'ich, 1 Peters Adm.
Dec., 233., and The Sclwoner Volunteer, 1 Sumner, 550, and the elabo-
rate discussion by Justice Story, already mentioned, in De Lovio v. Boit,
2 Gall. 398.
Even at the present day, the Statutes of the United States contain
provisions never to be reconciled with the British admiralty theory.
Thus Sect. 500 of the Code of Laws of the United States directs that
certain offenses committed on islands in the Pacific Ocean, on land,
"shall be deemed committed on the high seas on board a merchant ship
or vessel belonging to the United States." That certainly goes far be-
yond the rule we are contending for.
After some time, ihowever, some voices were heard holding the con-
trary doctrine, and arguing for the strictest adherence to whatever limi-
tation of admiralty jurisdiction the jealousy of English common law
courts had conceived. One of the first of these was the case of Ramsay
v. Allegre,6 where Mr. Justice Johnson wrote an elaborate opinion on
that side.
La Vengeance, 3 Dall. 297.
The Sally, 2 Cranch 406.
The Betsey and Charlotte, 4 Cranch 443.
The Samuel, 1 Wheaton 9.
The Octavia, 1 Wheaton 20.
'12 Wheaton 611.
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So did Justice Baldwin, in the case of Boni v. The Schooner James
and Catherine7
A number of cases in which the Court held the more liberal doctrine
of Story and the first Congress are accompanied by dissenting opinions.
Thus, in the Genesee Chief, Mr. Justice Daniels argues elaborately, and
with some feeling, against extending admiralty to the Great Lakes. It
will be noted, in all those cases, that the justices of the Supreme Court
who were on that side belonged to the extreme states' rights party. They
aimed at preserving the Constitution of the United States against what
they conceived to be the perversions of it by Chief Justice Marshall,
Story, and others. Their opposition to a liberal construction was based
on political rather than juridical grounds. Justice Johnson, in the Al-
legre case cited above, added to his strict construction theories a violent
attachment to trial by jury. He says: "I am fortifying a weak point
in the Constitution. Every advance of the admiralty is a victory over
the common law, a conquest gained upon the trial by jury." In other
words, his mind seemed to live in the atmosphere of English common
law courts of the time of the Stuarts."
Justice Daniels in the Genesee Chief, complains feelingly: "My opin-
ions may be deemed to be contracted and antiquated, unsuited to the
day in which we live, but they are founded upon deliberate conviction
as to the nature and objects of limited government, and by myself at
least cannot be disregarded."9
History has passed beyond the day of the strict constructionists and
brushed away their artificial notions regarding the Constitution. Why
retain relics of that age, such as the rule in the Plymouth case?
It seems to me that any fear that the Supreme Court, at the present
day, may hold unconstitutional a statute giving to the federal admiralty
courts jurisdiction over torts committed by vessels afloat, although the
damage is to property on land, is quite fanciful. Aside from the rule
of stare decisis, every argument logically pursued is in favor of such an
act. Wharves, dockwalls, and similar facilities are certainly of a mari-
time nature. They would not exist unless they were necessary for navi-
gation. Bridges, to be sure do exist also where there is nothing mari-
time; but in that case no ships pass through them, and the question of
jurisdiction cannot arise. The particular character of a bridge which
can be damaged by a ship is determined by the fact that there is navigable
water and vessels afloat on it, as where the bridge is of the bascule or
swinging types. The very reason why there is a special maritime law and
'1 Baldewin 544.
'Ravtsay v. Allegre, 12 Wheaton 640.
* The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 465.
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an admiralty court, to-wit: the mobile nature of the ships that constantly
enter and pass out again, affects injuries they do to the land just as much
as those they do to other vessels in a collision.
THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION
There does not seem to be much dispute about the desirability of legis-
lation, in such form as Mr. Plunkett suggested in a paper before the
American Association of Port Authorities, or some other appropriate
form that may be devised.10
All vessels doing damage are not owned by financially responsible
parties, easily located by process servers, and subject to jurisdiction of
the common law courts. An opportunity for proceeding in rem is in-
dispensable for obtaining redress in numerous cases. The vessel itself
may 'be, and often is, the only property of her owner, subject to execu-
tion. Claims for torts of this kind are apt to run into high figures. To
be sure, it has been suggested that the states might provide for attach-
ments to take the place of libels in admiralty. Some states, including
Wisconsin, have such laws; but there is a well-founded apprehension on
the part of lawyers that they are inapplicable where interstate and foreign
commerce are involved. The only effective remedy must come from the
courts of the United States.
A number of ports on the Great Lakes have a special interest in this
matter, in addition to that which they share with all ports. The harbors
in many cities are in part composed of comparatively narrow and wind-
ing rivers, across which there are numerous bridges, usually of the bas-
cule or swinging bridge type. Collisions with these bridges by vessels
passing through them are of common occurrence, and the collection of
damages for such injuries is a regular part of -the duties of municipal
law authorities. Their success in -doing so is by no means conspicuous.
It would be very much greater if they could compel the giving of a bond
by the guilty vessel, before it could proceed on its voyage.
"° See World Ports, vol. 16, p. 474 (1928).
